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WHAT’S DIFFERENT ABOUT THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT, 
AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
JAMES GRAY POPE∗
 When I entered law school back in 1980, the Thirteenth Amend-
ment beckoned as the noblest and most fascinating of all constitu-
tional provisions.  Most spectacularly, it had singlehandedly trans-
formed the Constitution of the United States from that of a slave 
nation to that of a modern republic.
 
1  From my point of view as a re-
cently laid-off ship welder, it also mattered that the Thirteenth 
Amendment is the only currently operative constitutional provision 
that addresses the law of labor, having displaced the fugitive slave 
(“held to Service or Labour”) clause.2   Moreover, the Thirteenth 
Amendment stands out as the sole rights guarantee that protects not 
only against government, but also against private concentrations of 
power, including multi-national corporations.3
Why?  We might speculate that some people oppose broad inter-
pretation because they fear the likely substantive outcomes.  The same 
features that attracted a laid-off ship welder might well repel others, 
and for similarly result-oriented reasons.  Over time, however, I have 
come to believe that at least part of the explanation may be found in 
the distinctively difficult interpretive questions posed by the Amend-
ment.  Part I of this Essay discusses four unique features of the 
  Yet, to put it mildly, 
others did not share my fascination.  In fact, many considered it a 
waste of time to converse about an Amendment that, in their view, 
had been conclusively consigned to the dustbin of history.  They 
agreed with me that the Amendment was unique but, to my frustra-
tion, they found it to be uniquely suited for narrow interpretation.     
 
Copyright © 2011 by James Gray Pope. 
∗ Professor of Law & Sidney Reitman Scholar, Rutgers University School of Law–
Newark. 
 1. On the centrality of slavery to the original United States Constitution, see ALFRED 
W. BLUMROSEN & RUTH G. BLUMROSEN, SLAVE NATION: HOW SLAVERY UNITED THE 
COLONIES & SPARKED THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 171-202 (2006); DAVID 
WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION 3–20 
(2009). 
 2. On the labor dimension of the Amendment, see Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vi-
sion of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1989). 
 3. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 
931, 932 (1988). 
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Amendment that give rise to interpretive questions of unfamiliar 
kinds.  The difficulty of these questions may help to account for why, 
approaching the sesquicentennial of the Amendment, courts have yet 
to make any serious attempt at answering them, and the Amend-
ment—in spite of its potentially broad scope—remains limited to a 
few, narrowly circumscribed doctrines.4
Part II of the Essay considers three purportedly unique features 
of the Amendment that have been invoked as reasons to limit its 
scope and relevance.  Specifically, the Amendment has been said: (1) 
to be uniquely unambiguous, and therefore unsuited for interpreta-
tion; (2) to require uniquely bright-line or “absolute” doctrines; and 
(3) to be uniquely limited by its historical context or purposes.  Upon 
examination, however, these claims appear misplaced.  
   To put the point positively, 
scholars may have a crucial role to play in puzzling out these unfami-
liar and difficult questions, so as to unblock the development of Thir-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence.  Specifically, Part I suggests that 
the Amendment is: (1) the only constitutional provision that man-
dates the official identification and protection of unenumerated 
rights; (2) the only constitutional provision that calls for the devel-
opment of rights protections based on the dynamics of a nongovern-
mental system (the First Amendment “system of freedom of expres-
sion” notwithstanding); (3) the only constitutional provision that 
directly commands the government to undertake a project of social 
transformation; and (4) the only constitutional rights guarantee that 
is generally acknowledged to attack relations of subjugation and ex-
ploitation.  
I.  FOUR UNIQUE FEATURES OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
1.  The Thirteenth Amendment is the only constitutional provision that  
clearly mandates the official identification and enforcement of unenumerated 
rights.  From the earliest congressional debates to the most recent 
court decisions, nobody has doubted that Section 1 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment guarantees certain fundamental rights.5
 
 4. On the potentially broad scope of the Amendment, see Akhil Reed Amar, Remember 
the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403 (1993).  On its currently truncated scope, see Al-
exander Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment’s Revolutionary Aims, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: 
THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 1, 13-14 
(Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010)  [hereinafter THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY]. 
  Nor has it been 
 5. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864) (Rep. Ingersoll) (explain-
ing that the Thirteenth Amendment was created to protect “certain inalienable rights” in-
cluding the “right to till the soil, to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and enjoy the 
rewards of his own labor”); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441–44 (1968); Tsesis, THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 4, at 10–12; 
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questioned either that Section 1 authorizes courts to enforce those 
rights or that Section 2 empowers Congress to do the same.6  Yet, the 
Amendment mentions no right.  Instead, courts and Congress are left 
with the task of determining what rights are necessary to negate the 
prohibited conditions of slavery and involuntary servitude.  By con-
trast, the Ninth Amendment declares the existence of unenumerated 
rights, but provides no criteria for recognizing them and says nothing 
about who is to identify or enforce them.7
This feature would not be remarkable if the only rights guaran-
teed were the “right to be free from slavery” and the “right to be free 
from involuntary servitude.”
 
8  Immediately following ratification, 
southern states adopted that position.  They enacted “Black Codes” 
that enforced labor discipline on freed people using vagrancy laws, 
restrictions on mobility, and a variety of other measures that differed 
significantly from slavery but also infringed basic freedoms like the 
right to change employers.  The great majority of northerners, how-
ever, reacted to the Black Codes with outrage.  While southerners 
held that the Amendment did nothing more than abolish the specific 
conditions of slavery and involuntary servitude, northerners assumed 
“that when the positive law of slavery fell away, the former slave was 
left with a broad panoply of basic civil rights.”9  Under authority of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress promptly enacted this view in-
to law.  The Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed a set of rights that ex-
tended far beyond those necessary to negate a condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude (narrowly defined as forced labor), including 
“the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens” to “make and en-
force contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, inherit, pur-
chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”10  The 
Peonage Act of 1867 prohibited “voluntary” as well as involuntary 
peonage without any racial referent.11
 
MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND 
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 235 (2001); VanderVelde, supra note 
   
2, at 443–504.  
 6. Section 1 is self-enforcing.  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20, 23.  Section 2 pro-
vides: “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIII.  
 7. The Amendment reads in full: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. IX. 
 8. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 700 (9th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 934 (1988). 
 9. William M. Wiecek, Emancipation and Civic Status: The American Experience, 1865–
1915, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 4, at 78, 83. 
 10. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.  
 11. Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546. 
PopeFinalBookProof 12/7/2011  10:20 AM 
192 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:189 
Today, Thirteenth Amendment rights claims generally fall into 
one of two categories: rights to be free from certain forms of race dis-
crimination, conceptualized as “badges and incidents of slavery,” and 
rights of labor freedom, analyzed under the involuntary servitude 
clause.12  Scholars have proposed standards for assessing particular 
rights claims in both categories, but—reflecting the general underde-
velopment of Thirteenth Amendment doctrine—no standard has 
been clearly articulated or consistently applied by the courts.13
2.  The Thirteenth Amendment is the only constitutional provision that  
calls for the development of rights protections based on the dynamics of a non-
governmental system.  There is a natural tendency to interpret broad or 
ambiguous rights guarantees in relation to their functions in the con-
stitutional system of government.  For example, the Equal Protection 
Clause has been read to establish the principle of one-person, one-
vote on the ground that the “right to vote freely for the candidate of 
one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restric-
tions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.”
  The 
choice of such a standard might be facilitated by taking into account 
the following additional features of the Amendment. 
14
 
 12. In cases involving race discrimination, the question has hinged on whether the 
particular type of race discrimination (for example, in the sale or rental of housing) con-
stitutes a “badge or incident” of slavery.  See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409, 440–41 (1968).  In cases involving race-neutral infringements of the freedom of labor, 
on the other hand, the issue usually centers on the extent and nature of employer control.  
See, e.g., Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 948; Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).   
  
But judges and legal scholars are also drawn to engage in systemic in-
terpretation outside the governmental context.  Consider, for exam-
ple, the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.  Thomas Emerson 
famously conceptualized free speech rights as components of a system 
of freedom of expression designed not only to facilitate political dis-
cussion, but also to promote individual self-realization and the search 
for truth.  Emerson’s book, The System of Freedom of Expression, has been 
 13. William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges 
and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1313–14, 1320, 1366 (2007) (noting the 
absence of any standard for identifying badges or incidents of slavery and proposing that 
the determination should hinge on “whether the identity of the victim and the nature of 
the injury demonstrate a concrete link to the system of chattel slavery”); James Gray Pope, 
Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 
YALE L.J. 1474, 1478–79 (2010) (noting the absence of any standard for assessing labor 
rights claims and arguing that the Court should adopt as a general standard the approach 
used in Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18, namely that a claimed labor right is protected under the 
Amendment if it is necessary to provide workers with the “power below” and employers the 
“incentive above” to prevent “a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work”).   
 14.  Reynolds v. Sims, 337 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 116–18 (1980). 
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cited in no fewer than twenty-two Supreme Court opinions.15  The 
Court has also deployed a more particularized systemic model of free 
speech, the “marketplace of ideas,” which is said to be “open” and 
“uninhibited.”16
By contrast, the text of the Thirteenth Amendment expressly 
mandates a systemic approach.  Slavery and involuntary servitude are 
not just things that happen to individuals; they are systems of labor 
control.  During the congressional debates, proponents and oppo-
nents of the Amendment spoke of “a conflict between two systems; a 
controversy between right and wrong,” of changing “their system of 
labor from compulsory to voluntary,” of choosing between slavery, on 
the one hand, and “free institutions and free labor” on the other, and 
of supplanting slavery with the “system of free labor.”
  But the text of the First Amendment, which states 
simply that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech,” provides no apparent sanction for either Congress or the 
courts to design and institute a free speech system. 
17  In this view, 
the abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude necessarily entailed 
the establishment of a free labor system.  In Pollock v. Williams, the Su-
preme Court confirmed that one “undoubted aim of the Thirteenth 
Amendment . . . was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a sys-
tem of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United 
States.”18
Only once, however, has the Supreme Court provided a glimpse 
into the nature of this system.  In Pollock, the Court struck down a law 
that restricted the right to quit work and thus imposed “forced la-
bor.”
  It would appear, then, that the Thirteenth Amendment af-
firmatively commands both Congress and the courts to ascertain what 
rights are necessary to ensure the permanent extinction of the slave 
labor system and the ongoing operation of a free labor system.  
19
 
 15.  THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1971); Lexis 
search of Supreme Court cases for “System of Freedom of Expression” within the same 
sentence as “Emerson,” conducted Oct. 6, 2011. 
  But the Court’s reasoning, which centered on the operation 
of the “general basic system of free labor,” swept more broadly.  “[I]n 
general,” wrote Justice Robert Jackson, “the defense against oppres-
 16.  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896, 906 (2010) (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 
539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) & N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 
(2008)). 
 17. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2615 (1864) (Rep. Morris); id. at 1440 (Sen. 
Harlan); id. at 2944 (Rep. Higby); id. at 2983 (Rep. Mallory); see also id. at 2685 (Rep. Kel-
ley asserting that the Amendment would “establish freedom as a permanent institution, 
and make it universal”). 
 18. 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944). 
 19. Id. at 17–18. 
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sive hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment is the right to 
change employers.  When the master can compel and the laborer 
cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to re-
dress and no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or un-
wholesome conditions of work.”20  How does “the right to change 
employers” generate this “power below” and “incentive above”?  Jus-
tice Jackson did not explain, but the logic seems clear.  As long as 
workers effectively enjoy that right, then employers that exert harsh 
domination and impose unwholesome conditions should be punished 
with quits, while those who offer better terms should be rewarded 
with loyalty.  But what if the right to change employers by itself failed 
to produce this result?  What if, for example, employers formed a car-
tel and refused to hire any workers who would not submit to starva-
tion wages?  Then, by the logic of the systemic approach, workers 
would also need the right to set the wages for which they were willing 
to work.21  Pollock thus suggests, as Archibald Cox pointed out long 
ago, that the standard for determining whether a given labor right is 
protected by the Thirteenth Amendment hinges on whether it is ne-
cessary to provide workers with the “power below” and employers the 
“incentive above” to prevent “a harsh overlordship or unwholesome 
conditions of work.”22
3.  Alone among constitutional provisions, the Thirteenth Amendment 
directly commands the government to undertake a project of social transforma-
tion.  Many newly enacted laws change social practice, and some do so 
in dramatic and far-reaching ways.  The Nineteenth Amendment, for 
example, instantly conferred voting rights on millions of women.  And 
that shift, in turn, altered the field of interpretation on other issues 
involving women’s rights: Could the same Constitution that welcomed 
women into the polity as full voting members simultaneously permit 
legislatures to treat them as inferiors in other realms?  Some courts 
thought not, and read the Amendment “to have implications for mat-
  Since Pollock, however, the Court has refrained 
from systemic analysis, leaving this as another area awaiting future de-
velopment. 
 
 20. Id. at 18.  On the right to change employers, see Shaw v. Fisher, 102 S.E. 325 (S.C. 
1920).  In Shaw, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment 
had “annulled” the tort of hiring a laborer who was under a contractual obligation to work 
for another, though there was no legal or physical restraint on the laborer’s right to quit, 
and no finding that he could not have worked with family members, found some other 
means of support, or departed the state.  Id. at 326, 327.  At stake, evidently, was the labor-
er’s right to participate in the free labor system.  
 21. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Pope, supra note 13, at 1533–36. 
 22. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18; Archibald Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. 
L. REV. 574, 576–77 (1951). 
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ters other than voting, including matters concerning the law of mar-
riage.”23
This type of command commits the government to root out the 
prohibited practice wherever it appears and to enact whatever meas-
ures might be necessary to prevent it from recurring.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment imposes this difficult and continuing duty on both Con-
gress (by virtue of Section 2) and the courts (because the Amendment 
is self-enforcing).  With regard to an enumerated right, like the right 
of women to vote or the right to speak freely, courts and Congress 
might reasonably consider their job done once individuals possess an 
effective legal entitlement to exercise the right.  But Thirteenth 
Amendment rights cannot be considered successful unless they are 
actually exercised to ensure that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary 
servitude . . . shall exist . . . .”
  We might say, then, that the Nineteenth Amendment 
worked a transformation by declaring a new right, directing the gov-
ernment to enforce it, and causing ripple effects beyond the scope of 
the newly declared right.  The Thirteenth Amendment issued a dif-
ferent kind of transformative command, directly banning the social 
practices of slavery and involuntary servitude.  A women’s rights 
equivalent might have proclaimed something like “Patriarchy shall 
not exist within the United States.”  
24  In light of events since 1865, this pro-
nunciamento recalls to mind the tale of Cnut the Great, who report-
edly set up his throne on a beach and commanded that the tide not 
rise to wet his robes.  As illustrated by the Black Codes of the late 
1860s, no sooner has one form of servitude been eliminated than 
others will emerge to replace it.  Despite the Peonage Act of 1867, 
backed up by broad Supreme Court interpretations, old-fashioned 
debt peonage remained common in southern agriculture through the 
1960s.25  Recent decades have seen the emergence of new forms of 
slavery, grouped under the label of “human trafficking” or the “new 
slavery.”26  By any definition, involuntary servitude continues to exist 
in the United States today.27
 
 23. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and 
the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 953 (2002). 
  This poses an ongoing challenge for 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (emphasis added). 
 25. See PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901–1969, 
170–92 (1990); DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR AFTER 
SLAVERY 46–62 (1978). 
 26. See, e.g., KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(rev. ed. 2004) (1999). 
 27. See KEVIN BALES & RON SOODALTER, THE SLAVE NEXT DOOR: HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA TODAY (2009). 
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courts, Congress, and all Americans who take seriously fidelity to the 
Constitution.  
4.  The Thirteenth Amendment is the only constitutional rights guarantee 
that is generally acknowledged to attack relations of subjugation and exploita-
tion.  As Abraham Lincoln pointed out in 1864, the concept of “liber-
ty” could support either effective freedom for all or the “liberty” to 
dominate and exploit others: “With some the word liberty may mean 
for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his 
labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to do 
as they please with other men, and the product of other men’s la-
bor.”28  Similarly, the phrase “equal protection of the laws” has been 
read to require “equal” protection of dominant and subordinate ra-
cially defined groups, thereby blocking targeted affirmative action on 
behalf of the latter with the effect, arguably, of preserving white racial 
privilege.29  By contrast, the Thirteenth Amendment directly attacks 
relations of domination and exploitation. “Slavery” and “servitude” 
involve, by definition, relations between masters and subordinates.  
Slavery is the “state of entire subjection of one person to the will of 
another,” while servitude is the “state of voluntary or involuntary ser-
vice to a master.”30
 
 28. Tsesis, supra note 
  Admittedly, the text leaves a loophole; it could be 
read to permit a worker “voluntarily” to enter into a contract for servi-
tude that would then become involuntary by virtue of the enforce-
ment mechanisms available to the employer.  The Supreme Court re-
jected that approach a century ago, however, reasoning that the 
Amendment was intended “to render impossible any state of bon-
dage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the 
personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s 
4, at 9 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, At the Fair in Baltimore, in 
Aid of the Sanitary Commission (April 18, 1864), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE MARTYR’S 
MONUMENT 252 (The American News Co. ed., 1865)).  
 29. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201, 226 (1995) (holding that 
strict scrutiny applies to benign as well as invidious racial classifications because “it may not 
always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign”).  This doctrine provides white 
people with an effective constitutional right to enjoy the benefits of past societal discrimi-
nation as well as present discrimination that cannot be proven to be intentional.  See Der-
rick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Myth, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1609 (1989); 
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1766–77 (1993).   
 30. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1241, 1207 
(1865); see also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (defining servitude as “‘the 
state of voluntary or compulsory subjection to a master’”); JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1314, 1352 (1860) (defining slavery as “[t]he state 
of absolute subjection to the will of another” while defining servitude as “[t]he state or 
condition of a servant, or more commonly of a slave; slavery; bondage”). 
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benefit which is the essence of involuntary servitude.”31  The concept 
of “badges and incidents of slavery” incorporates this focus on domi-
nation.  The Amendment is concerned not with the irrationality or 
unfairness of race-based decisionmaking in the abstract, but with its 
function as a badge of slavery.  Thus, what made housing discrimina-
tion objectionable in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. was its functional 
equivalence to the Black Codes in securing “the exclusion of Negroes 
from white communities,” in “herd[ing them] into ghettos,” and in 
depriving them of the important right to buy property based on “the 
color of their skin.”32
The question is thus raised: What kinds of domination and ex-
ploitation fall within the scope of the Amendment?  Scholars have 
proposed a wide variety of applications including, for example, child 
abuse, spouse abuse, forced childbearing, and the denial of basic 
rights to immigrant workers.
  
33
II. THREE PURPORTEDLY UNIQUE FEATURES OF THE AMENDMENT 
THAT MAY NOT BE 
  These claims, in turn, pose the doc-
trinal question: By what criteria should such claims be addressed?  
The current limitation to intentional race discrimination and coerced 
labor appears arbitrary in light of the Amendment’s text, which is not 
restricted to forms of slavery or servitude based on race or targeted at 
productive labor.  Scholars have proposed a wide variety of criteria in 
the course of advocating various types of claims, but we have yet to 
conduct a sustained discussion of the question. 
1.  The Thirteenth Amendment does not appear to be uniquely unambi-
guous or unsuited for interpretation.  In the Slaughter-House Cases, a major-
ity of the Supreme Court signed on to the view that the words of the 
Thirteenth Amendment “seem hardly to admit of construction, so vi-
gorous is their expression.”34
 
 31. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).  For a detailed discussion of the cases, 
see Pope, supra note 
  Since I began studying the Amendment 
three decades ago, many people have told me that I was wasting my 
13, at 1481–91. 
 32. 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968); see also Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination 
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 284 (2010).   
 33. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth 
Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992); Joyce E. McConnell, 
Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE 
J. L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992); Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor Revisited: The Thirteenth 
Amendment and Abortion, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 4, at 226; Maria Ontive-
ros, Immigrant Workers and the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra 
note 4, at 279.  
 34. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873). 
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time because of this purportedly undeniable fact.  Upon examination, 
however, the text of the Amendment appears to raise its full share of 
interpretive quandaries.  For example, the question of what makes ac-
tion “involuntary” or coerced has long been a topic of sharp disputa-
tion among philosophers.35  Nor is it obvious what constitutes “servi-
tude,” a term that has been used to describe relations ranging from 
ordinary “service” to full-blown “slavery.”36  More broadly, the inclu-
sion of the phrase “involuntary servitude,” in addition to the narrower 
term “slavery,” raises the possibility that the Amendment might have 
been “purposely left to gather meaning from experience” and that it 
might have “created new meanings of freedom even for the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries.”37  Then there is the clause permitting sla-
very “as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been du-
ly convicted.”  Is convict labor truly “a punishment for crime” when 
instituted with the economic purpose or effect of removing jobs from 
the free labor system and depressing the “working conditions and liv-
ing standards” of free workers?38  For a final example, the concept of 
badges of slavery raises numerous questions ranging from the validity 
of the doctrine itself to various possible applications, for example to 
the denial of important rights based on immigration status.39
2.  The Thirteenth Amendment does not appear to require uniquely 
bright-line or “absolute” doctrines.  Beginning with moral abolitionists like 
William Lloyd Garrison, there has been a tendency to view slavery as a 
uniquely horrific evil that is sharply distinguishable from other, more 
nuanced forms of oppression.  Kevin Bales, a leading scholar of 
present-day abolitionism, maintains that slavery amounts to the “theft 
 
 
 35. See, e.g., GERTRUDE EZORSKY, FREEDOM IN THE WORKPLACE? 5–14 (2007); ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 262–64 (1974); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, 
CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 1–26 (2001).  For a discussion 
of the concept as used in the Thirteenth Amendment, see Pope, supra note 13, at 1527–36. 
 36. For a discussion of various definitions, see Pope, supra note 13, at 1503–07. 
 37. Note, The “New” Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294, 
1301 (1969); David Brion Davis, Foreword: The Rocky Road to Freedom: Crucial Barriers to Aboli-
tion in the Antebellum Years, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 4, at xi, xxiii. 
 38. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944) (observing that the “[r]esulting depres-
sion of working conditions and living standards affects not only the laborer under the sys-
tem [of forced labor], but every other with whom his labor comes in competition”).  On 
convict labor as an economically driven policy with negative effects on free labor, see Da-
vid M. O’Shinsky, Convict Labor in the Post-Civil War South, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY, su-
pra note 4, at 100, 103–06, 111–15; ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (1996). 
 39. George A. Rutherglen, The Badges and Incidents of Slavery and the Power of Congress to 
Enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 4, at 163, 177; 
Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers’ Rights in a Post-Hoffman World—Organizing Around the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651, 677–78 (2004).  
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of an entire life” and that it is “more closely related to the concentra-
tion camp than to questions of bad working conditions.”40  This sen-
timent finds jurisprudential expression in the idea that Thirteenth 
Amendment rights should be demarcated by bright-line doctrines so 
that protection can be “absolute” (i.e., not subject to balancing) with-
in their scope.  For example, Archibald Cox acknowledged that de-
spite purposive arguments of “considerable force” to the contrary, the 
Amendment should protect only rights that could be exercised by in-
dividuals acting alone because protection for associational rights 
could not be absolute in view of the compelling public interest in re-
gulating them.41
Upon reflection, however, this approach of exclusive absolutism 
appears unworkable and ill-advised.  No right is truly absolute.  Even 
the individual right to cease work, for example, would not protect a 
surgeon who quits during an operation or a bus driver who abandons 
her bus in the middle of a desert.  And if the concern is to prevent the 
erosion of core rights by ad hoc balancing, there is nothing to prevent 
the application of  hard-edged rules to certain core rights (for exam-
ple, those that by definition are necessary to negate a condition of sla-
very or involuntary servitude), while applying balancing tests ranging 
from strict to relatively deferential scrutiny to other rights.  This 
would seem to accord better with the Amendment’s purpose not sole-
ly to eliminate the prohibited conditions of slavery and involuntary 
servitude, narrowly defined, but to leave in their place a free labor sys-
tem.
   
42  Furthermore, and most importantly, an exclusively absolutist 
approach is not likely to be effective.  However distinctive the evil of 
slavery might be, it does not follow that its effective elimination can be 
accomplished with a narrow set of absolute rights.  Even Kevin Bales 
has argued that various free labor rights, including the right to form 
and join unions, may be essential to the practical elimination of sla-
very.43
 
 40. BALES, supra note 
  
26, at 7.  
 41. Cox, supra note 22, at 577, 579.  
 42. See supra text accompanying notes 18–22. 
 43. Bales has joined with Ron Soodalter in proposing that the protections of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (which guarantees the rights to organize and engage in con-
certed activities) be extended to all American agricultural and domestic workers on the 
grounds that “otherwise, as recent history has shown, they will continue to be more sus-
ceptible to enslavement than other workers in America” and that, where free and enslaved 
workers labor in close proximity, organized free workers can provide economical and 
highly effective enforcement service.  BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 27, at 263.  Building 
on the work of Bales, Soodalter, and others, I have suggested elsewhere that a Thirteenth 
Amendment free labor approach to labor and sex trafficking might usefully supplement 
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3.  The Thirteenth Amendment is not uniquely limited by its historical 
context or purposes.  The notion that the Thirteenth Amendment has 
present-day relevance is often met with the objection that it was 
enacted to eliminate slavery, and that was accomplished long ago.  
Proponents of this view can point to the Supreme Court’s observation 
that the “obvious purpose” of the clause was to “forbid all shades and 
conditions of African slavery” including, for example, long-term ap-
prenticeships, serfdom, Mexican peonage, and the “Chinese coolie” 
labor system.44
The fact that the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted to accom-
plish a specific historical purpose does not, however, differentiate it 
from other constitutional rights guarantees.  The Free Speech Clause 
of the First Amendment was adopted to outlaw prior restraints on 
speech, for example, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth to protect against race discrimination in the area of civil (as 
opposed to political and social) rights.  Eventually, however, the Su-
preme Court focused on the broad wording of those provisions and 
approached them as sources of principles and not as freeze-frame 
bans on specific historical practices.  As a result, the Free Speech 
Clause now protects against punishment of speech as well as prior re-
straints, and the Equal Protection Clause against sex as well as race 
discrimination, and against discrimination pertaining to social and 
political as well as civil rights.  Furthermore, upon reflection, it ap-
pears perverse to single out the Thirteenth Amendment for crabbed, 
freeze-frame interpretation on the ground that applying the usual 
methods of interpretation would demean the suffering of African 
slaves.  Today,  nearly a century-and-a-half after the Amendment’s ra-
tification, workers of color continue to be concentrated in the most 
dangerous, unhealthy, and poorly remunerated sectors of the econo-
my.  Being born with black skin has roughly the same impact on a 
worker’s prospects of employment as a felony conviction.
  Arguments that the Amendment applies to less egre-
gious forms of labor control are sometimes met by claims that this 
would “demean” the suffering of enslaved Africans. 
45
 
the prevailing approach of criminal prohibition.  James Gray Pope, A Free Labor Approach to 
Human Trafficking, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (2010). 
  As in 
1865, workers of color stand to gain from full and effective enforce-
 44. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69, 72 (1873); see also Butler v. Perry, 
240 U.S. 328, 332–33 (1916) (opining that the Amendment covers only the historical prac-
tice of African chattel slavery along with “forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery 
which, in practical operation, would tend to produce like undesirable results”). 
 45. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 955–62 (2003) 
(study involving four testers posing as job applicants, two black and two white, one of each 
racial category with a felony conviction and one without).   
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ment of the Amendment.  Thus, it is not surprising that, instead of 
claiming special ownership of the Amendment, African-American 
workers have welcomed its application to workers of all colors in situa-
tions quite different from nineteenth century chattel slavery.  With as-
sistance from the New Orleans Workers Center for Racial Justice 
(“NOWCRJ”), for example, workers trafficked from South Asia chal-
lenged their conditions as amounting to involuntary servitude under 
the Thirteenth Amendment.  NOWCRJ Director Saket Soni reported 
that “the African-American community, which is also part of our 
membership, didn’t say ‘You don’t have the right to say this is invo-
luntary servitude.’  Instead, they said ‘you know what, that reminds us 
of what’s been going on down here for a long time.’”46
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
The past few years have seen an undeniable surge of scholarly in-
terest in the Thirteenth Amendment.  Some people view this as a 
boon, a long overdue reassessment of an underutilized and vitally im-
portant constitutional provision.  Others see it as a misguided attempt 
to read a “wish list” of present-day demands into a provision that has 
been deservedly relegated to obscurity.  Whichever one’s point of 
view, controversies arising from the four unique features of the 
Amendment discussed here are likely to exert an important influence 
on the outcome.   If, as argued above in Part I, the Amendment clear-
ly mandates the identification of unenumerated rights, then what 
standard should guide that determination?  And if the Amendment 
calls for a systemic approach to the elimination of slavery and its re-
placement by free labor, then what are the defining attributes of a 
free labor system, and what rights are essential to its operation?  Fur-
ther, if the Amendment commands the government to undertake a 
difficult and as yet incomplete social transformation, then how can 
this imperative be met?  Finally, if the Amendment unambiguously at-
tacks relations defined by subjugation and domination, then how is 
the constitutionally objectionable level of subjugation and domina-
tion to be determined? 
 
 46. Saket Soni, Speech at the Left Forum (March 21, 2010) (available at 
http://www.radioproject.org/2010/08/working-beyond-unions-labor-day-special-encore/) 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  Historically, black workers analogized labor injunctions to sla-
very and invoked the Thirteenth Amendment.  See JOE WILLIAM TROTTER, JR., COAL, 
CLASS, AND COLOR 114 (1990) (quoting black miners’ testimony before Congress); 
WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 138–39 
(1991) (quoting black unionist’s newspaper article).      
PopeFinalBookProof 12/7/2011  10:20 AM 
202 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:189 
It is often said that the Thirteenth Amendment is uniquely un-
suited for the kind of probing interpretation that will be necessary to 
answer such questions.  People have insisted that it is uniquely unam-
biguous and therefore unfit for interpretation, that it is uniquely ab-
solute and therefore in need of simple, bright-line boundaries, and 
that it is uniquely limited to its historical context and therefore inap-
plicable to present-day practices.  As argued in Part II above, however, 
these claims appear to be without any principled basis, and therefore 
give us no excuse for interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment with 
any less diligence and thoroughness than we apply to other constitu-
tional provisions.  
